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1. INTRODUCTION
International investment law plays a unique role in the
regulation of sovereign conduct. Although originating as a form of
customary international law, today international investment law
derives its authority and its legitimacy from the approximately
2500 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") and several multilateral
investment treaties currently in force.1 Through these treaties,
more than 170 countries have consented to treat foreign
investments according to standards established by international
law. In addition, in almost all cases those states have consented to
allow investors to submit investment-related disputes to
international arbitration. Such uniformity of consent is rare and
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like to thank Professor Perry S. Bechky for his helpful comments. The Article is
better for his efforts, although all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility
of the Author. The Author also would like to thank Jill Sidford and Elanor
Gonzalez for their invaluable research assistance. The views expressed herein are
solely those of the Author and do not reflect the views or positions of Shearman &
Sterling LLP, its partners, associates, or clients.
1 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 155, 156-57 (2007) (noting that "[bly 2006, the nations of the
world had concluded nearly 2,500 BITs affecting 170 countries and several other
important investment treaties," and that "[flor all practical purposes, treaties have
become the fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign
investment").
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has been characterized as one of the "more remarkable
developments in international law in the past 40 years."
2
The reach of the international investment law system is broader
today than at any other time in history. The system, however, has
reached a crossroads. The proliferation of BITs and other
investment treaties has created potentially significant problems for
States and investors alike. International investment law developed
rapidly over the past thirty years to meet the expectations of a
diverse constituency -developed (i.e., capital-exporting) countries,
developing (i.e., capital-importing) countries, and private
investors. While aligned in their desire to create a stable
framework for international investment, each of these groups
brings unique expectations and demands to the system. Although
there has long been criticism of international investment law, the
system is now experiencing challenges that call into question its
ability to meet the expectations of its constituents in a sustainable
and predictable manner. For example, in an unprecedented move,
Bolivia has withdrawn from the Washington Convention and has
severed its ties with the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). Similarly, Venezuela, Nicaragua,
and Argentina have each publicly questioned their long-term
commitment to international investment law. Even the United
States has called into question the current system by redefining the
scope of protections it provides to foreign investments in its
bilateral investment treaties. Although isolated at the moment,
these examples could foreshadow serious systemic challenges to
the continued development of international investment law.
2. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
2.1. The Development of International Investment Law
Foreign investment has existed for centuries. Nevertheless,
despite the prominence of foreign investment in the political and
economic relations of states, efforts to create a legal regime
governing its treatment were slow in coming and were fraught
with controversy. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
captured the frustration surrounding the early development of
international investment law when it wrote:
2 R. DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPuTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 2 (2005).
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Considering the important developments of the last half-
century, the growth of foreign investments and the
expansion of the international activities of corporations, in
particular of holding companies, which are often
multinational, and considering the way in which the
economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first
sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has not
gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the
matter have crystallized on the international plane.
Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the facts
shows that the law on the subject has been formed in a
period characterized by an intense conflict of systems and
interests. It is essentially bilateral relations which have
been concerned, relations in which the rights of both the
State exercising diplomatic protection and the State in
respect of which protection is sought have had to be
safeguarded. Here as elsewhere, a body of rules could only
have developed with the consent of those concerned. The
difficulties encountered have been reflected in the evolution
of the law on the subject.3
The difficulty in creating a system of international investment
law reflected in the ICJ's opinion was subsequently echoed by
Judge Stephen Schwebel when he commented, "[flor some two
hundred years, the international community was divided over
what law governed the treatment of foreign investment and over
the content of that law."4 That divide was largely between
developed and developing countries.5  Developed countries
advocated that international law, which already served as a
constraint on sovereign conduct generally, should regulate
treatment of foreign investment. 6 Indeed, because international
law had long regulated the treatment of aliens by states, developed
countries believed it was entirely reasonable that international law
3 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46-47
(Feb. 5).
4 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on
Customary International Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 27 (2004).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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also govern the manner in which states treated the property of
foreign nationals.
7
By contrast, developing countries rejected the notion that
international law could regulate their conduct towards, and control
of, foreign investments.8 During this time, developing countries
challenged the traditional views that international law could affect
any aspect of a State's domestic regulations. 9 Initially found in the
statements and writings of Argentine foreign minister Carlos
Calvo, many developing countries took the position - ultimately
known as the Calvo Doctrine -that foreign investors were subject
solely to the laws and remedies of the host government. 10
According to Calvo, foreign investors were entitled to no better
treatment than that accorded to domestic investors of the host
state." Moreover, foreign investors should not have recourse to
dispute resolution procedures that were not available to nationals
of the host government.12 The principles of the Calvo Doctrine
were embodied in the constitutions and treaties of many Latin
American countries.13 Ultimately, the developing countries' views
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 127 (2007)
("Calvo Clauses typically can be found in constitutions, domestic legislation,
international treaties and contracts signed between foreign investors and Latin
American governments.") (footnote omitted); see also DONALD SHEA, THE CALVO
CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY
21-32 (1956).
11 See Shan, supra note 10, at 124 (noting that the equality of foreign investors
and nationals is the essence of the Calvo Doctrine); see also Denise Manning-
Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle:
Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169, 1195
(1995) (" [Tihe second principle of the Calvo Doctrine, equality of the national and
foreign investor, is the one remaining element of the Calvo Clause that lives
unhindered and, indeed, has found new life.").
12 See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Calvo's Grandchildren: The Return of Local
Remedies in Investment Arbitration, 4 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 3 n.11,
4-5 (2005) (noting that "[u]nder this doctrine foreigners doing business in a
country were to be treated in exactly the same way as local nationals. This meant
that these foreigners were to be restricted to local means of dispute settlement, i.e.,
domestic courts," and discussing the minimal extent to which domestic courts are
actually relied upon to settle investment disputes).
13 See, e.g., CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA DE VENEZUELA DE 1961, art. 127
(incorporating into every contract of public interest a clause that grants Venezuela
courts sole jurisdiction over contractual disputes); Constituci6n Politica de la
Reptiblica de Honduras de 1982 art. 33 ("Foreigners may not file claims nor
demand indemnity of any kind from the State, except in the form and in the cases
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regarding international law's role in regulating foreign investment
were memorialized in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States (the "Charter"), 14 which provided, "[e]very State
has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources,
and economic activities."' 5 The Charter went on to state, "[e]ach
State has the right.., to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer
ownership of foreign property .... In any case where the question
of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals... "16 Similarly, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3171 declared a sovereign government that expropriates
foreign property "is entitled to determine the amount of possible
compensation and the mode of payment... [A]ny disputes which
might arise should be settled in accordance with the national
legislation of [that] State.... ,,17
Although neither the Charter nor General Assembly Resolution
3171 constitute formal statements of international law and, indeed,
espouse views that are seemingly in direct conflict with
international law,'8 they reflect the differences between developed
in which Hondurans may do so."); Constituci6n de la Repfiblica de Bolivia art. 24
("Foreign subjects and enterprises are subject to Bolivian law, and in no case may
they invoke exceptional circumstances or recourse to diplomatic claims."). For
texts of these constitutions, see CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flan eds., 1971).
14 See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award on
Damages, 9 ICSID Rep. 264, para. 497 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter CME Final
Award] ("The controversy came to a head with the adoption by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of the 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States'.").
15 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974).
16 Id.
17 G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 17, 1973), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1974).
18 See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L
LAW. 295, 296-303 (1975) (discussing the Charter's "relationship to international
law," noting that it is non-binding, and discussing certain "substantive provisions
of the Charter [that] undermine existing rules of international law"). For an
opposing view-i.e., that the norms supported by developing countries
supplanted the traditional norms of international law regarding the protection of
foreign investments -see, for example, Robin C. A. White, A New International
Economic Order, 24 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 542, 547 (1975) (arguing that the Charter,
because passed by "at least" 104 voting nations, would have force in the
international legal context, and noting that provisions of the Charter are favored
by developing nations).
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and developing nations regarding the treatment of foreign
investments. More significantly, they highlight the divide between
those countries with respect to the role of international law in
regulating and resolving foreign investment disputes. For
example, 120 developing countries voted to adopt the Charter, six
countries (including the United States and five Western European
countries) voted against it, and ten countries abstained. 19
Nevertheless, despite the rhetorical significance of these
documents and the numerical superiority of the voting bloc
supporting them, the standards of conduct established by
international law emerged as the norm against which the treatment
of foreign investments was measured.
In the early 1970's, there was a shift in the way that developing
countries viewed foreign investment and the role international law
should play in its regulation.20 Many developing countries saw
foreign investment as a means of bolstering their economies and
thus softened their resistance to the rule of international law.
Although the international community was (and remains) unable
to achieve consensus for an overarching agreement of the
regulation of foreign investment, many developing countries
believed it was in their self-interest to enter into bilateral
relationships as a means of attracting foreign investment into their
countries.
During this period, at the behest of developed countries and
investors, the international community shifted from reliance on
customary international law to treaties as the basis for protecting
foreign investments. This shift was caused principally by a belief
that customary international law could not adequately protect
foreign investments. For example, customary international law
"failed to take account of contemporary investment practices and
to address important issues of investor concern, such as their rights
to make monetary transfers from the host country." 21 Moreover,
the scope of protections provided by international investment law
19 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 Reporters'
Notes 1 (1987) ("The Charter was adopted 120 in favor, 6 against, and 10
abstentions, the vote reflecting the views of the majority as developing states, with
the United States among the dissenters and other Western developed states either
dissenting or abstaining.").
20 See Schwebel, supra note 4, at 28.
21 Salacuse, supra note 1, at 155.
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was subject to debate within the international community. 22 Most
importantly, however, customary international law did not
provide investors a direct right of action against host governments
to pursue investment-related claims.23 Bilateral investment treaties
were viewed as the most practical solution to these problems.
Between the early-1970s and today, over 170 countries entered
into more than 2200 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") and a
handful of multilateral hybrid treaties (collectively "investment
treaties") -such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Central American Free Trade Agreement, the Energy Charter
Treaty, and APEC, that set forth a minimum standard of treatment
for foreign investments.24 "[T]hese treaties are truly universal in
their reach and essential provisions" 25 and have "become an
integral part of international relations." 26 Indeed, as the arbitral
tribunal in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States wrote:
[T]he vast number of bilateral and regional investment
treaties.., almost uniformly provide for fair and equitable
treatment of foreign investments, and largely provide for
full security and protection of investments. Investment
treaties run between North and South, and East and West,
and between States in these spheres inter se. On a
remarkably widespread basis, States have repeatedly
obligated themselves to accord foreign investment such
treatment. In the Tribunal's view, such a body of
concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the
content of rules governing the treatment of foreign
investment in current international law. 27
To understand the significance of investment treaties and their
role in the international legal system it is important to understand
what they do. First, they create a minimum standard of treatment
22 See id. (noting that "the principles.., were often vague and subject to
varying interpretations").
23 See id. (stating that "existing international law offered foreign investors no
effective enforcement mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries").
24 See BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
25 See CME Final Award, supra note 14, para 497.
26 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 327 (1994).
27 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF) 99/2, Award,
6 ICSID Rep 181, para. 117 (October 11, 2002).
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that governments commit to apply to foreign investments. 28 One
of the most striking aspects of investment treaties is their
uniformity. 29 In many respects, this uniformity is to be expected
because the vast majority of BITs in force today were based on the
model treaties developed by the United States and certain
European countries.30 Although there are certainly substantive
and procedural differences among the treaties currently in force,
31
the vast majority of treaties define the scope of an investment and
provide investors broad protection against uncompensated
expropriation, discriminatory treatment by a host government and
the inequitable or arbitrary application of the law.32 In addition,
28 See Schwebel, supra note 4, at 28.
29 See, e.g., BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 2, at 8 ("While
differences in some standards may be found among [BITs], there is an astonishing
similarity in the most important rules."); U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD],
Geneva, Switz., June 12-14, 2002, Experiences With Bilateral and Regional Approaches
to Multilateral Cooperation in the Area of Long-Term Cross-Border Investment,
Particularly Foreign Direct Investment, para. 5, TD/B/COM.2/EM.11/2 (May 8,
2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD- Experiences] ("A distinctive feature of BITs is that
their overall format, substantive scope and content have remained largely
unchanged over the past 40 years."); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1529 (2005) ("The provisions of
investment treaties are remarkably similar."); Maurits Lugard, Toward an Effective
International Investment Regime, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 485, 485 (1997)
(remarks by Kenneth J. Vandevelde) (noting the "emerging consensus"
concerning international capital flows and prerequisite legal structures).
30 Although the model treaties developed by the United States and various
European countries contained many similarities, they also contained significant
differences. For example, European treaties generally did not protect the rights of
investors to freely convert local currency, prohibit the imposition of performance
requirements, or protect against uncompensated expropriation as well as the
American treaties. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really
Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46
HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 73 (2005).
31 The main differences among BITs currently in force include: the extent to
which certain sectors are exempted from the protections provided by a BIT; the
inclusion (or lack thereof) of a National Treatment provision; the treatment of
performance requirements; and, in some cases, the inclusion of an exhaustion of
local remedies requirement. UNCTAD -Experiences, supra note 29, para. 7.
32 See Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferation of International
Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219,
226 (2002) ("[Hlost state obligations under BITs typically include guarantees of
fair and equitable treatment as determined by international law, national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, guarantees of free repatriation of
profits and liquidated proceeds; and most significantly, the duty to pay full
economic value in the event of expropriation."). Historically, the major
differences among BITs centered around three areas: (a) the types of activities that
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the vast majority of BITs guarantee foreign investors the right to
convert local currencies and to repatriate profits.
33
Second, investment treaties almost universally give investors
the right to submit disputes to international arbitration. Although
many early BITs included an exhaustion of remedies requirement
(a lingering vestige of the Calvo Doctrine), this began to change in
the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s onward, most BITs allow
private investors to bring their disputes directly to international
arbitration.34 This is arguably the most significant right given by
investment treaties. Under traditional international law,
individuals and corporations did not have standing to bring claims
directly against foreign governments. 35 Aside from bringing suit in
the domestic courts of the host country (a thoroughly disfavored
option), the only recourse available to investors was to request that
their home government take up their cause and espouse their claim
through either diplomatic negotiations or formal suit in the ICJ.
36
Espousal is an inefficient and ineffective means of resolving
disputes, and one that was frequently overwhelmed by the
political sensitivities of the day.37 Thus, despite the fact that a
constituted an investment; (b) when a venture qualified as an "investment" and
therefore fell within the protections of the treaties; and (c) whether the treaties
applied to investments that were made prior to the entry into force of the treaty.
Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business
Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 7
(Yale Law Sch. Ctr. L., Econ. & Pub. Pol'y., Res. Paper No. 293, 2005) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121. See also, Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 30, at
80.
33 See UNCTAD -Experiences, supra note 29, para. 6 ("The great majority of
BITs has a provision on the transfer of payments. Current BITs guarantee the free
transfer of payments related to, or in connection with an investment.").
34 The bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Argentina
was hailed as the first BIT in which a Latin American country retreated from its
insistence that foreign investors submit disputes for resolution to domestic courts
prior to pursuing international arbitration. Letter of Submittal to the President of
the United States from the Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1993), available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/43232.htm.
35 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Recent Developments in State Responsibility:
The Codification of the Law of State Responsibility, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 224,
234-46 (1989) (noting the expansion of "personal rights" under international law).
36 Id.
37 See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83-84 (1994)
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, former Dep't of State Legal Advisor) ("[Tihe
Department [of state]'s decision with respect to espousal is likely to be influenced,
not only by the merits of the case, but by the Department's concern for offending a
foreign state and creating a potential irritant in its dealings with that state."); see
2008]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'I L.
private investor may have had a perfectly valid legal claim against
a foreign government, that investor may very well have been
unable to vindicate its rights and hold the host government
accountable because politics precluded the investor's home
government from espousing its case. By granting investors a
private right of action against governments, investment treaties
effectively depoliticized the dispute-resolution process and
increased the legal accountability of states.
Third, investment treaties effectively give developing and other
capital-importing countries an opportunity to display an "open for
business" sign.38 By publicly affirming their respect for and
commitment to the rule of law, these countries hope that investors
will look favorably at them and will consider the risks of the past
to have been mitigated. 39
There are a number of reasons why international investment
law has developed so expansively and quickly during the BIT era.40
Most notably, however, increased globalization and a rise in the
number of cross-border investments over the last quarter of a
century have spurred the need for a legal regime that can mitigate
risk, provide a measure of certainty, and ensure the continued
also David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and its Discontents, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 475, 483-84 (2001) ("Individual grievances have tended to be
subordinated to the greater good of the nation in its pursuit of common foreign
policy objectives."); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 160-62 (1992) ("[T]he government may be reluctant to
espouse because of a fear that the investment dispute could damages [sic] its
relations with the expropriating country and interfere with other foreign policy
objectives.").
38 See, e.g., Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract
FDI? Only A Bit... and They Could Bite 2 (The World Bank Dev. Research Group,
Paper No. 3121, 2003) ("It is hypothesized that countries with weak domestic
property rights can increase their attractiveness as a potential host by explicitly
committing themselves to honoring property rights of foreign investors.").
39 See, e.g., Radil Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement
of Investment Disputes under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 LAW & Bus.
REV. AM. 501, 504 (2002) ("Credibility went hand in hand with the acceptance by
states of their international liability in the promotion and protection of foreign
investments.").
40 The number of BITs entered into on an annual basis increased between
1990 and 2004. In 1990, for example, approximately 50 BITs were signed
worldwide. Between 1994 and 1996, that number peaked at roughly 200 BITs per
year. Since then, the number of BITs signed each year has decreased, but still
remains higher than 1990 levels. In 2004, 73 new BITs were concluded. U.N.
Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], New York & Geneva, 2005, World Investment
Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internalization of R&D, 24 U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2005.
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growth of the global economy. 41 Stated more simply, international
investment law has developed and expanded because of money.
Statistics show that approximately $730 billion in foreign-direct
investment ("FDI") was expended in 2004, with the vast majority
of this money -approximately $500 billion-going to developing
countries.42 During that same year approximately $11 trillion
dollars in goods and services were traded around the world.43 In
the mid-1990s, the amount of global FDI topped the amount of
government aid given to developing countries.44 Over the past 25
years, foreign investment levels have increased from
approximately $55 billion per year to the present levels-an
increase of over 1300%.
45
2.2. The Expectations of the Participants in the International
Investment Regime
Given the magnitude of FDI occurring each year, it is not
surprising that investors and governments are striving to develop
a stable legal regime to govern investment. Each group
participating in the international investment process has a
significant stake in the continued growth of the law. In addition,
each group brings with it expectations and demands that
occasionally overlap, but frequently diverge.
41 See, e.g., Lugard, supra note 29, at 486 ("[T]here has been a dramatic
transformation in attitudes toward an international investment regime. The
division between developed and developing countries has been replaced by a
consensus, and that consensus has produced the emerging regime."); Jeswald W.
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 659-60 (1990)
(considering the dramatic growth of BITs in light of the capital needs of
developing countries).
42 UNCTAD, Major FDI Indicators, http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/
TableViewer/tableview.aspx?reported=899.
43 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2004 (Leading
Exporters and Importers of the World), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
res-e/statis-e/its2004-e/its2004_e.pdf.
44 See Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: WAhat Economists
(Don't) Know and What Policymakers Should (Not) Do!, Monographs on Investment and
Competition Policy, CUTS Center for International Trade, Economics and
Environment at i (2002).
45 UNCTAD, supra note 42.
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2.2.1. Meeting the Expectations of Developing Countries:
Balancing the Hope for Increased Investment against the
Cost of Signing a BIT
Of the approximately 2800 BITS currently in force, most are
between developed and developing countries. As of 2000, over 50
percent of the foreign investment made in developing countries
was subject to the protections provided by BITs.46 The large
number of BITs between developed and developing countries is
not surprising given the reasons behind the international
investment law system's creation. The current system was created
to persuade private investors to supplement, and eventually
replace, the state aid that was given following World War 11.47
Developing countries need foreign investment 48 and the access to
the hard currency that it brings. Although foreign investment
cannot resolve all of a country's problems, and indeed has the
potential to create significant societal issues, it can stimulate
faltering economies, expand trade opportunities, strengthen
infrastructure, and lead to improved governance.49 Signing a BIT,
therefore, allows developing countries to publicly affirm their
commitment to foreign investment by binding themselves to
international legal standards. 50 By entering into BITs, developing
46 Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITS?, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 131, 138 (2005).
47 See BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("Efforts to organize
both international protection for foreign investment and methods of resolving
disputes began in earnest after World War II.").
48 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 77 ("[Dleveloping countries sign
BITs to promote foreign investment, thereby increasing the amount of capital and
associated technology that flows to their territories.") (emphasis in original);
Swenson, supra note 46, at 131-32 ("Developing countries often compete for
foreign investment with the hope that [it] will bring a wide range of economic
benefits.").
49 See, e.g., BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that
"[f]oreign investment is not a panacea for all that ails such societies, but in the
absence of sufficient public funds, it can provide a way to jump start some
economies, a short cut to higher wages, an improved infrastructure, and better
schools and hospitals."); Benjamin H. Sheppard, Jr. et al., International Commercial
Dispute Resolution, 39 INT'L LAW. 235, 243-44 (2005) ("A BIT is intended to protect
and encourage investment by investors of one country in the territory of the other
country. BITs endeavor to mitigate the risks associated with investing abroad by
providing investors with significant investment protections and access to
international arbitration. On a macroeconomic level, BITs are intended to
stimulate investment flows and result in the increase of exports, greater economic
development, and economic integration between the two countries.").
50 Such a public commitment is important because, as Professors Tobin and
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countries may be able to circumvent systemic deficiencies that
increase the perceived risk of investing in that country, such as the
lack of an adequate legal system or other institutional structures
capable of enforcing property protections.5 1 In many ways, signing
a BIT may help legitimize a developing country in the international
arena and, thus, attract increased levels of foreign direct
investment.52
Although BITs offer developing countries the prospect of
increased foreign investment, they do so at a cost. Frequently,
developing countries do not offer effective means of protecting
property rights. Either their legal systems do not recognize such
rights or, to the extent that property rights are recognized, the
judicial infrastructure is incapable or unwilling to enforce those
rights.5 3 Consequently, by entering into BITs, many developing
countries create a two-tiered system-one that provides greater
property rights to foreign investors than it does to domestic
investors.5 4  A simple hypothetical scenario can illustrate the
Rose-Ackerman note, developing countries frequently "cannot make credible
commitments not to violate their own country's rules." Tobin & Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 32, at 5.
51 See Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 32, at 5 (noting that "most
developing country governments do not have the legal systems and institutional
structures in place to adequately enforce laws."). Interestingly, however, at least
one empirical study has shown that "developing countries that have signed a BIT
tend to be richer, larger, and more democratic" than developing countries that
have not signed any BITs. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic
Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
107, 114 (2005).
52 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and
Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192 (Walter Carlsnaes et
al. eds., 2001) (discussing the role of organizations in the legitimization of
international affairs); Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000 11 (Am. Law & Econ. Assoc. Annual
Meetings, Working Paper No. 31, 2005) ("BITs give host governments a
competitive edge in attracting capital if there are otherwise doubts about their
willingness fairly to [sic] enforce contracts.").
53 See, e.g., Elkins et al., supra note 52, at 11 ("Governments with little inherent
credibility are more likely to sign BITs than are governments known for their fair
treatment of foreign capital.").
54 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 122 (warning that "BITs and the
expanding regime of international substitutes may have other negative effects on
the development of domestic institutions. Besides offering a favorable dispute
resolution regime to foreigners, BITs facilitate substantive advantages to
investors. Most BITs restrict performance requirements imposed by the host
government, but allow positive performance incentives such as tax breaks and
simplified regulatory procedures. This means that in fact, domestic investors face
both competitive and institutional disadvantages in the investment climate.").
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consequences of this two-tiered system. Assume that two identical
enterprises, one that is owned by a national of the host country and
one that is owned by a U.S. investor, are opened in a country that
has a BIT with the United States. The BIT provides that
"investment disputes" may be brought to international arbitration.
Now assume that the host government enacts a series of laws and
regulations that effectively destroy the economic value of both
enterprises. The domestic investor's sole recourse is to sue its
government in its own courts and argue that, as a matter of
domestic law, the government's actions entitle him to
compensation. By contrast, the U.S. investor may bring his claim
to international arbitration and argue that the host government
breached the express protections set forth in the relevant BIT. It is
conceivable that a U.S. investor could be compensated for actions
taken by a host government while a domestic investor goes
uncompensated simply because the U.S. investor can benefit from
the higher standards created by international law. This disparity
creates the potential for many different problems, not the least of
which is a backlash against foreign investments and unrest among
domestic business ventures.
In addition to creating a two-tiered system, BITs also constrain
the extent to which governments can govern. Although
international investment law does not prohibit governments from
passing laws, enacting regulations, or taking other lawful
measures, it may require those governments to pay compensation
when their actions adversely affect a foreign investment. For
example, in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, an ICSID tribunal held that
the Mexican government breached its obligation to provide fair-
and-equitable treatment to a foreign investor by failing to "ensure
a transparent and predictable framework for [the investor's]
business planning and investment." 55 The tribunal further held
Mexico liable because it did not provide Metalclad with an
"orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of
a Party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and
justly."5 6
In Tecnicas Medioambien tales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican
States, an ICSID tribunal held that the Mexican government
breached its obligation to treat the claimant "fairly and equitably"
55 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, 5 ICSID Rep. 209, para. 99 (Aug. 30, 2000).
56 Id.
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when it refused to renew the claimant's license to operate a
hazardous waste landfill. According to the tribunal, the
government's actions undermined the expectations held by
investors at the time that they made their investments.5 7 The
tribunal further stated that the fair-and-equitable treatment
requirement, found in virtually all BITs, compels governments to:
provide to international investments treatment that does
not affect the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment.
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the
goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply
with such regulations.58
Although the Tecmed formulation does not constitute black-
letter law, it reflects an expansive view of fair-and-equitable
treatment that has been espoused by foreign investors and a
number of tribunals.5 9 At a minimum, the fair-and-equitable
treatment requirement compels governments to act with vigilance
to ensure the protection (both physical and economic) of foreign
investments. Under this formulation, the fact that a government's
actions may be wholly consistent with its domestic laws, serve the
broad interests of the country, are in good faith 60 and are
57 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 154 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC602_En&caseId=Cl86.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA
Case No. UN 3467, Final Award in the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration, para.
183 (July 1, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-Ecuador
FinalAward_001.pdf; Metalclad, supra note 55, para. 99 (Aug. 30, 2000) ("Mexico
failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad's business
planning and investment. The totality of these circumstances demonstrates a lack
of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party
acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance
with the NAFTA.").
60 See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Award, para. 372 (July 14, 2006) available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
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implemented in a non-discriminatory manner does not absolve it
from liability if those actions injure or impair a foreign
investment.61
Critics of the current system of international investment law
argue that the Tecmed "rule" and other broad standards established
by tribunals make it difficult for governments to govern.62 Under a
strict reading of the Tecmed rule, governments would be obligated
to consult with foreign investors in advance of taking any
regulatory action. Mere notice of a new regulation, however,
would not be sufficient to avoid liability. Rather, the government
would be required to ensure that new regulations did not
undermine the basic expectations held by the foreign investors at
the time their investments were made regarding the legal and
business environment in the host country. Even if every foreign
investment in a country was made at the same time, it would be
extraordinarily difficult to meet the expectations of every foreign
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC507_En
&caseld=C5 (finding a "common thread" in recent arbitral awards that the fair
and equitable treatment standard does not require "bad faith or malicious
intent[]"); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, para. 280 (May 12, 2005) available at http://icsid
.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC504_En&caseld=C4 (stating that the fair and equitable standard is
an objective standard "unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any
deliberate intention or bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course,
such intention and bad faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential
element of the standard.").
61 See, e.g., EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case UN 3481, Partial
Dissenting Opinion (Feb. 3, 2006), para. 72, reprinted in 45 I.L.M. 901, 960 (making
the distinction that "[w]hat may not be wrongful under local Ecuadorian law or
an interpretation thereof may be wrongful under the Treaty or international law
no matter what the Ecuadorian courts say or fail to say. State conduct found to be
licit under national law-for example, because the State in breach complies with
the decisions of its own courts-may however constitute a public international
law infringement, particularly when the State's international obligations at stake
are set out in a treaty (to which such State is a party) vesting an international
arbitral tribunal with the power to adjudicate on such infringement.").
62 For example, in Occidental Exploration and Prod. Corp. v. Ecuador, a tribunal
held that the "stability of the legal and business framework is thus an essential
element of fair and equitable treatment" and held Ecuador liable for changing its
tax laws "without providing any clarity about [the change's] meaning." LCIA
Case UN 3467, Award, paras. 183-84. See also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, para. 124 (Oct. 3,
2006) available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC627_En&caseld=C208 ("[T]his
Tribunal must conclude that stability of the legal and business framework is an
essential element of fair and equitable treatment in this case....").
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investor. It becomes even more difficult to meet these expectations
when investments are made over time and investors enter the
market under different business, economic, social, and legal
conditions.6
3
Although the principal goal of developing countries in signing
a BIT is to attract FDI, empirical studies have found mixed results
regarding the link between the BITs and FDI. Indeed, "[t]he most
sophisticated analyses to date have found that BITs have had little
effect on increasing FDI."64 For example, a 1998 UNCTAD study
found only a marginal positive relationship between signing a BIT
and increased foreign direct investment. 65 In a leading study,
Professors Salacuse and Sullivan determined that although the
presence of a U.S. BIT has a "large, positive, and significant
association" with a country's overall FDI inflows, the presence of
BITs with other developed countries had a very weak positive
effect on the level of FDI.66 Surprisingly, the existence of BITs
between developing countries actually had a negative effect on FDI
inflows.67 The Salacuse and Sullivan study also showed that
factors such as a country's GDP and its adherence to the rule of law
both had "positive significance" in determining the level of FDI
inflows.68 The work of Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman
also found that, although the presence of a BIT contributed to an
63 Notably, not all tribunals have held governments to the same broad
standards set forth in Metalclad and Tecmed. For example, in Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
United Mexican States, the tribunal held:
[Tihe minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is
infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or
racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome
which offends judicial propriety -as might be the case with a manifest
failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of
transparency and candour in an administrative process.
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, para. 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), reprinted in 43
I.L.M. 967, 986 (2004).
64 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 117.
65 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN
THE MID-1990S, Annex I at 159-217, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales
No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998).
66 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 105.
67 But see id. (finding that adding a new OECD BIT or a BIT with a developing
country only has a weak statistical effect).
68 See id. at 106 (finding as expected).
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increase in FDI, rates of economic growth, population, inflation
levels, and market size each had statistically significant effects on
FDI inflows.6
9
In their study, Professors Salacuse and Sullivan wrote that "a
BIT between a developed and a developing country is founded on
a grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the
prospect of more capital in the future." 70 The data, however, seem
to show that the ability of a developing country to achieve the
benefit of this bargain depends on much more than the mere
existence of a BIT. BITs do not work in isolation and, therefore, do
not (and cannot) guarantee access to increased foreign investment.
2.2.2. Meeting the Expectations of Developed Countries:
Protecting Investments and Promoting the Rule of Law
in Developing Countries
Developed countries bring to the international investment law
system three basic expectations. First, and most basic, they wanted
to provide their citizens with property rights protections that
rivaled those available in their domestic legal systems. 71  As
Professor Michael Reisman commented, the international
investment law system "consciously seek[s] to approximate in the
developing.., state the minimal legal, administrative, and
regulatory framework that fosters and sustains investment in
industrialized capital-exporting states." 72 In many respects, this
goal has been met. More countries have bound themselves to
international investment law through BITs or regional investment
treaties than at any other time in history. Although the mere fact
that a developing country has signed a BIT cannot guarantee that a
69 See Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 32, at 22 (describing results of the
study generally and stating that "BITs by themselves do not determine the [FDI]
flows.").
70 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 77.
7 Kenneth Vandevelde has stated that the principal goal of the BIT system
was to (a) "build a network of treaties adopting the principle that the
expropriation of foreign investment was unlawful unless accompanied by
prompt, adequate and effective compensation," (b) by establishing certain
minimum standards of protection to which American investment was entitled, (c)
ensure transparency in the host state's laws, and (d) create binding dispute-
resolution procedure available to enforce the minimum standards of protection
guaranteed by the treaties. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The BIT Program: A Fifteen-
Year Appraisal, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 532, 534-35 (1992).
72 W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its
Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 118 (2003).
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foreign investment will not be subject to adverse government
action, it does ensure investors from developed countries access to
procedural and substantive rights that closely mirror those of their
home states.
Second, developed countries (in particular, the United States)
wanted to remove themselves from resolving investment
disputes. 73 As stated, by creating a private right of action for
investors, governments effectively depoliticized investment
disputes and transferred the responsibility and cost of enforcement
to investors. In doing so, developed countries can avoid the
delicate balance between protecting their citizens' interests abroad
and maintaining positive relations within the international
community. 74
Third, developed countries hoped that the BIT regime would
increase the global respect for property rights and lead to an
improvement in the domestic legal systems of developing
countries that participated in the regime. This is a corollary to the
expectation that BITs would give foreign investors access to
property rights protections that were similar to those available in
developed countries. Whereas BITs principally serve as a
substitute for domestic institutions, not all government actions
give rise to international liability. 75 Foreign investors, therefore,
may need to resolve certain disputes through a host country's
domestic courts. To the extent that BITs can raise the level of
property rights recognized by those courts, foreign investors will
be better protected.
This expectation should be consistent with the goals of
developing countries as they try to ensure their long-term
development. As the conflicting data as to whether signing a BIT
results in increased FDI show, the developing world's long-term
growth is not tied exclusively to the existence of BITs. Developing
73 See id. (describing how BIT regimes transfer responsibility from
industrialized to developing countries in ensuring an optimal legal,
administrative, and political framework for investment).
74 See, e.g., Franck, supra note 29, at 1525-26 ("In order to avoid the historical
difficulties associated with 'gunboat diplomacy,' countries have promulgated
treaties to promote foreign investment and instill confidence in the stability of the
investment environment.").
75 For example, BITs do not allow foreign investors to bring ordinary
commercial, tort, or contract disputes to international arbitration. Rather, BITs
create distinct causes of action (e.g., fair-and-equitable treatment, expropriation,
discriminatory, or arbitrary treatment) that are intended to protect against
governments acting in their capacity as governments.
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countries must create conditions favorable to sustainable growth,
such as impartial courts, an efficient and effective bureaucracy, and
regulatory transparency.76 "[A] host state must do far more than
open its doors to foreign investment and refrain from overt
expropriation" to benefit from the international investment
system. 77 Indeed, host states must "establish and maintain an
appropriate legal, administrative, and regulatory framework, the
legal environment that modem investment theory has come to
recognize as a conditio sine qua non of the success of private
enterprise."
78
It is difficult to determine the effect that BITs have on domestic
legal systems and institutions. A 2005 study, however, suggests
that the effect is limited. After reviewing several years worth of
data, and applying well-established governance models, this study
applied a series of mathematical regressions to determine the effect
of BITs on "subsequent institutional quality." 79 According to the
study's author, "the results are intriguing":
Of eight regressions with results at the 90% confidence
level, three have negative signs. New BITs adopted in 1995
or 1996 were associated with declines in levels of
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of
law, and corruption control in the year 2000. On the other
hand, they were associated with statistically significant
improvements in government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, and corruption control in 1998, and improvements
in the rule of law in 2002. Finding any negative relation
between BIT adoption and institutional quality is
counterintuitive, given the manner in which the
76 See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 72, at 117 ("The 'favourable conditions'
established by BITs consist, not merely of natural phenomena such as climate,
resources, and access to the sea, nor even an educated population in the host state
receptive to and eager to participate in the benefits of foreign investment; they
also contemplate, more significantly and innovatively, an effective normative
framework: impartial courts, an efficient and legally restrained bureaucracy, and
the measure of transparency in decision that has increasingly been recognized as a
control mechanism over governments and as a vital component of the
international standard of governance.").
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 120-21 (showing that under some
circumstances, international devices may be substitutes for local institutions and
lead to reductions in governance quality).
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[governance] variables are calculated.... One would think
that adoption of a BIT, to the extent it is a signal to such
actors, to be associated with increases in perceived
governance performance, so that any observed negative
result may in fact understate the real decline.8 0
2.2.3. Meeting the Expectations of Private Investors:
Mitigating the Risk Associated with Foreign Investment
It is generally recognized that "[p]rudent investors will not risk
substantial capital in a foreign enterprise unless the financial
prospects are promising and the legal structure is sufficient to
protect the investment."8' Private actors, therefore, expect that the
international investment law system will provide them with
greater protections against the unilateral actions of governments,
thereby minimizing the risks to their investments. The ICSID
system was intended to meet that expectation.8 2 The system is
working. More investment disputes are pending before ICSID and
in UNCITRAL or other ad hoc forums than at any time in history.
Although the presence of a BIT is not determinative of where an
investor will invest, the presence of a BIT is a significant factor in
the investment decision. Of all the constituencies, the expectations
of private investors have been most successfully met.
3. EMERGING CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
3.1. Challenges to the Arbitral System
3.1.1. Latin America
Despite the international investment law system's apparent
successes, there is some concern that the system has not (and,
perhaps, cannot) meet the expectations of developing countries in a
predictable and sustainable manner. Many of the emerging
challenges to the system in general, and to ICSID in particular,
80 Id.
81 BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
82 See, e.g., Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention),
7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2001) ("The key purpose in establishing
ICSID was to assure foreign investors of protection under international law from
unilateral actions of host countries which could jeopardize their investments.").
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come from Latin America. There has been a significant increase in
the numbers of cases filed against Latin American countries over
the past several years. Indeed, statistics show that as of November
2005, over 200 investment-treaty-based arbitrations had been
filed.83  Of those arbitrations, approximately 75 percent were
brought against developing countries, the vast majority of which
were in Latin America.84
Whether these statistics reflect a change in attitude by investors
who are now willing to challenge conduct that they previously
accepted, or a change in the way certain Latin American
governments are treating foreign investments, is unclear.
Historically, Latin America appears to move in trends -during the
1990s the majority of Latin American countries favored economic
liberalization. It was during this period that Latin American
countries entered into the majority of their BITs. In this decade,
however, Latin America appears to be reacting to its perceived
over-liberalization by attempting to gain more control over foreign
investments. These governments, however, are constrained in
their ability to impose more conservative economic measures by
binding commitments they made when signing BITs. Regardless
of the reason for the increase in investment disputes, many Latin
American (and other developing) countries are unhappy with the
size and number of cases brought against them.
Although a number of Latin American countries have
expressed their dissatisfaction with the current international
investment law system, Argentina and Bolivia have led the way in
voicing their frustration.85 This Section briefly explores the steps
taken by Argentina and Bolivia.
83 U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., New York & Geneva, 2005, Latest
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, at 1-2,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2.
84 See id. at 3 (showing that forty-seven of sixty-one respondents in these
arbitrations were developing countries; the most cases were brought against
Argentina (forty-two cases, or approximately 20 percent of the total cases)).
85 Argentina is not alone in Latin America in expressing frustration with the
current system of international investment law. Between 1994 and 1999, the
Brazilian legislature refused to ratify fourteen BITs signed by their government.
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Total Number of Bilateral Investment
Agreements Concluded, (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite.pcbb/docs/brazil.pdf (showing that Brazil has signed fourteen
BITs). To date, the Brazilian legislature has refused to ratify any of these treaties.
Similarly, in Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has publicly condemned
international arbitration of investment disputes as being unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Instructivo Para la Revisi6n de los Proyectos de Contratos de Inters Ptiblico
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3.1.1.1. Argentina
Argentina has led the way in voicing its frustration with the
current system of law. Its actions are notable because of the
significant amount of foreign investment in Argentina at the time.8 6
Nevertheless, beginning in 2004, Argentina began to consider a
number of domestic measures that would have limited Argentina's
participation in the international investment law system and
effectively revived the Calvo Doctrine. In September 2004, the
Argentine legislature introduced a bill that would subject all
disputes involving the Argentine government to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Argentine courts.87 The proposed bill also
would have required Argentina to denounce all treaties and
international agreements in which it consented to the jurisdiction
of a foreign judicial or arbitral tribunal.88 In May 2005, the
Argentine legislature introduced another bill that would have
voided all waivers of sovereign immunity made by the Argentine
government and would have granted Argentine courts jurisdiction
over all disputes involving the Argentine federal, state, or local
governments.8 9 In addition, the law would have overturned the
Argentine law approving Argentina's ratification of the
Washington Convention.90  Finally, a bill introduced by the
Argentine legislature in August 2005 would have barred
international review of any matter related to the government's
Nacional que Serin Celebrados por la Rep6blica [Instructive Order No. 4], Official
Gazette No. 4989 (Mar. 8, 2001) (Venez.). For a discussion on Instructive Order
No. 4, see Bernardo Weininger & David M. Lindsey, Venezuela, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 223 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002). Pursuant to
this order, public contracts must be submitted to the Venezuelan Attorney
General to determine the constitutionality of any arbitration clause. See also,
Constituci6n de la Reptblica Bolivariana de Venezuela 1999 art. 151 (stating that
disputes arising from public contracts do not give rise to foreign claims).
86 For example, as of 2002, 49.6% of Argentina's manufacturing firms were
owned by multinational corporations. When joint ventures are taken into
consideration, this figure rises to 77%. Rajneesh Narula & Anabel Marin, FDI
Spillovers, Absorptive Capacities and Human Capital Development: Evidence From
Argentina 3 (MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series, Paper No. 016,
2003), available at http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/x645152071.pdf.
87 See Proyecto de Ley, Sept. 17, 2004, [6057-D] B.O. 138 (describing the
proposed bill as expressly invalidating any contractual or treaty clause that
purported to vest jurisdiction in another forum).
88 See id.
89 Proyecto de Ley 2759-D-05, November 2, 2005.
90 Id.
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economic policy or any determination by the Argentine courts
regarding claims of direct or indirect expropriation. 91  The
proposed law also required that a clause expressly barring
international review of such decisions be inserted into all
investment treaties as a condition of approval.92 The Argentine
judiciary has also taken steps to revive the Calvo Clause. In Josg
Cartellone Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidroelectrica Norpatag6nica
S.A, the Federal Supreme Court of Argentina ruled that
international arbitral awards may be subject to judicial review by
Argentina's courts to determine their fairness, reasonableness, and
constitutionality.9 3 According to the Court, the Argentine judiciary
must serve as the "guardian of [Argentina's] Constitution and of
public policy."94
3.1.1.2. Bolivia
Perhaps the most striking example of frustration with the
current system is Bolivia's unprecedented withdrawal from the
Washington Convention. On May 2, 2007, the Government of
Bolivia formally notified the ICSID Secretariat that it would
withdraw from the Washington Convention effective November 3,
2007.95 It further announced a systematic process of renegotiating
concession and foreign investment agreements with the goal of
restoring the purported economic equilibrium of the agreements
and creating terms more favorable to Bolivia.
The short-term effects of Bolivia's actions are unclear. At a
minimum, new investors should be wary of entering Bolivia and
existing investors should expect changes to the current investment
environment. In addition, and arguably more pressing, it is
unclear how Bolivia's actions will affect the ability of investors to
submit disputes to ICSID arbitration. Article 72 of the Washington
Convention provides:
91 Proyecto de Ley S-2577/05, Mar. 23, 2007.
92 Id.
93 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJNI, 1/6/2004, "Jos6 Cartellone
Construcciones Civiles S.A. v. Hidroelectrica Norpatag6nica S.A./proseco de
conocimiento," Fallos (2004-XXXVII-87) (Arg.).
94 Id.
95 See Damon Vis-Dunbar et al., Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from
ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, May 9, 2007,
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn-may9_2007.pdf (giving notice of Bolivia's
formal notice to ICSID declaring its withdrawal from the ICSID convention).
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Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71
shall not affect the rights or obligations under this
Convention of that State or of any of its constituent
subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State
arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given
by one of them before such notice was received by the
depositary. 96
On the face of this provision, absent some other jurisdictional
defect, investors who submitted disputes to ICSID arbitration prior
to May 2, 2007 should be able to have their dispute heard by an
ICSID tribunal notwithstanding Bolivia's withdrawal from the
Washington Convention.
Existing investors who were injured by the Bolivian
government before May 2, 2007 but who did not formally submit a
notice of arbitration (or otherwise submit to ICSID's jurisdiction)
may be in a different position. Credible arguments can be made
that this class of investors should be able to submit disputes to
ICSID well into the future. On its face, Article 72 refers solely to
the government's consent to arbitrate. As such, foreign investors
protected under any of Bolivia's twenty-two BITs in force prior to
May 2, 2007 should continue to be able to access ICSID. Bolivia's
consent to ICSID arbitration is grounded in the relevant bilateral
investment treaties, 97 and foreign investors can continue to take
advantage of that consent notwithstanding Bolivia's withdrawal
from the ICSID Convention.98
Others have argued that Bolivia's withdrawal from the ICSID
Convention likely will preclude investors who do not already have
pending arbitrations from submitting disputes to ICSID.99 Not
96 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 72, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
97 Arbitral tribunals have consistently held that such treaty provisions
constitute consent to ICSID jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lanco Int'l Inc. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, 5
ICSID Rep. 367 (Dec. 8, 1998) (holding that claims alleging a cause of action under
the bilateral investment treaties are not subject to the jurisdiction of
administrative courts).
98 See Vis-Dunbar et al., supra note 95, at 3 (quoting Fernando Mantilla-
Serrano, advisor to foreign investors, as saying, "[alt least from the plain meaning
of the text of the Convention, you don't need any other party to have acted on that
consent").
99 See id. (quoting Professor Christoph H. Schreuer, Professor of International
Law at the University of Vienna, as saying, "[i]f you look closer.., the six month
notice period offers very little comfort to investors and potential litigants").
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surprisingly, there are no awards specifically addressing the affect
that withdrawing from the Washington Convention has on
existing, but un-filed disputes. Tribunals and scholars, however,
have addressed the issue in the context of domestic investment
statutes and those cases may shed light on how a tribunal might
address the issue.
The system of international investment law is based on
consent - the consent of governments to be bound by certain
substantive obligations and the consent of both governments and
private investors to submit disputes to international arbitration.
Governments consent to ICSID jurisdiction by allowing for ICSID
arbitration either in a BIT, multilateral investment treaty, or
national legislation.100 Some scholars and tribunals have argued,
however, that the government's consent is not automatically
perfected. Rather, the consent given by governments to submit
disputes to ICSID has been analogized to a contractual offer that
can be perfected only upon the express acceptance of the
investor-typically either through the submission of a dispute to
arbitration or by serving the government a notice of the investor's
intent to arbitrate. 101 Proponents of this view argue that the right
to submit disputes to ICSID, therefore, is conditional and does not
vest at the time the investment is made. In cases where a
government has given its consent in a domestic investment law,
tribunals and commentators have clearly stated that "[a]n offer of
consent contained in national legislation ... that has not been taken
up by the investor will lapse when the legislation is repealed." 102
Indeed, "until the consent to arbitration becomes mutual, that is,
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., S. Pac. Props. (Middle East), Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 ICSID Rep. 102 (Nov. 27,
1985) (dealing with a request for arbitration received by ICSID from a Hong Kong
corporation, requesting arbitration proceedings be instituted under the
Washington Convention against the Arab Republic of Egypt); Tradex Hellas S.A.
v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 5
ICSID Rep. 43 (Dec. 24, 1996) (addressing a government's consent as given in a
national investment statute); Radl Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8
LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 501, 503 (2002) ("Consent of the investor is assumed when
the option is expressed on the request for ICSID arbitration.").
102 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 259
(2001); see also MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 53-54 (1993) (explaining that
consent may withdrawn so long as it was not irrevocable).
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until the investor consents, the State may, by repeal or amendment
of the investment law, withdraw its consent to arbitration."
103
The legal issues raised by Bolivia's actions are complex. It is
not possible to predict how a tribunal would rule in a case where
the government offers its consent to ICSID jurisdiction in a BIT and
then subsequently revokes the condition predicate for ICSID
jurisdiction- participation in the Washington Convention. Cases
in which a government's consent to arbitrate is contained in a
domestic investment statute are materially different from the
situation involving Bolivia. In the former, repeal of the domestic
investment statute revokes the contractual offer made to an
investor. In the case of Bolivia, the contractual offer still exists in
Bolivia's BITs. Withdrawal from the ICSID Convention did not per
se void that offer. The question remains, however, whether an
investor can accept that offer when the condition precedent to
ICSID jurisdiction- participation in the ICSID Convention-has
been withdrawn. That question will ultimately be decided by the
ICSID Secretariat, in the first instance, and perhaps ultimately by a
tribunal.104
The long-term consequences of Bolivia's actions are even more
uncertain. From a business perspective, potential and existing
investors may begin to rethink their commitments to Bolivia. At a
minimum, the cost of investing in Bolivia will increase because of
the increased risks that are attendant to Bolivia's actions.
Ultimately, however, the economic and financial consequences of
Bolivia's actions will depend on how the market reacts. Other
developing countries have consciously elected not to enter into the
international investment law system. For example, Brazil opened
its borders to foreign investment without entering into any BITs or
ratifying the Washington Convention. To date, Brazil has only
assumed regional investment obligations under the Protocol of
Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
103 Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement on Investment Disputes in
Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on
Investment, in 12 ICSID REV. 287, 320 (1997).
104 As a practical matter, this issue may be of little importance to may
investors. The majority of Bolivia's BITs provide investors with the option of
submitting investment disputes either to ICSID, another arbitral institution, or to
ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules. For the collection of BITs signed
by Bolivia, see http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779. As
a result, investors will be able to submit investment disputes to international
arbitration regardless of whether Bolivia is a party to the ICSID Convention.
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Investments in MERCUSUR. Nevertheless, Brazil is one of the
largest recipients of foreign direct investment in Latin America. 105
While recognizing that Brazil is a unique case because the size of
its economy and relative strength of its legal system offset many of
the risks that frequently dissuade investors from investing in
developing countries absent a BIT, if Bolivia is able to attract
investment after withdrawing from the Washington Convention,
other developing countries may follow in its wake.
From a legal perspective, the reasons for Bolivia's withdrawal
from the Washington Convention arguably are more important
than the act itself. Most notably, Bolivia is critical of what it sees as
the disparity in the current international investment law system
between states and investors. This criticism is not unique to
Bolivia. Indeed, there is growing concern among developing
countries that tribunals have expanded the scope of investment
protections beyond what they intended when they entered into
BITs. In doing so, governments frequently believe that their ability
to govern has been constrained.106
By their very nature, BITs require governments to cede a
portion of their sovereign authority. Governments voluntarily do
so in return for the possibility of increased foreign direct
investment. 07 Governments do not, however, expect to surrender
their ability to govern. As a result, developing countries brought
before an ICSID tribunal frequently defend their actions as merely
an exercise of sovereign authority. For example, Argentina has
consistently argued that its actions were a necessary exercise of its
sovereign right to govern. With one exception, that argument has
been rejected1 08 Similarly, in ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of
105 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], UNCTAD Annual
Report 2002, UNCTAD/EDM/2003/3 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/edm20033_en.pdf (describing practices of foreign direct aid to Brazil).
106 See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal, paras. 400-04 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docld=DC648_En&caseId=C231 (including arguments of the
Hungarian government to the effect that their ability to govern has been limited).
107 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing how best to balance the hope for
increased investment against the cost of signing a BIT).
108 See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, para. 245 (Oct. 3, 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docld=DC627_En&caseId=C208 (discussing how "the Tribunal
has determined that the conditions in Argentina from 1 December 2001 until 26
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Hungary, the Hungarian government argued that it was merely
exercising its sovereign right to govern when it passed certain
decrees and regulations purportedly stripping a private investor of
its investment.109  The tribunal rejected Hungary's argument,
holding:
The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent's position that
the actions taken by it against the Claimants were merely
an exercise of its rights under international law to regulate
its domestic economic and legal affairs. It is the Tribunal's
understanding of the basic international law principles that
while a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to
regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of such right is not
unlimited and must have its boundaries. As rightly
pointed out by the Claimants, the rule of law, which
includes treaty obligations, provides such boundaries.
Therefore, when a State enters into a bilateral investment
treaty like the one in this case, it becomes bound by it and
the investment-protection obligations it undertook therein
must be honoured rather than be ignored by a later
argument of the State's right to regulate.110
Although neither the Argentine cases nor the ADC tribunal's
holding bar governments from regulating, they serve as the basis
for a belief that governments are at a distinct disadvantage against
investors in the present international investment law system."'
Proponents of the international investment law system argue that
those cases simply reinforce the notion that governments must act
within the boundaries of international law and that, while they are
free to act, they may be required to pay compensation if their
April 2003 were such that Argentina is excused from liability for the alleged
violation of its Treaty obligations due to the responsive measures it enacted").
109 See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal, para. 384 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC648_En&caseld=C231.
110 Id. para. 423.
111 Although this is a problem that principally affects developing countries,
developed countries are also concerned that tribunals have expanded the scope of
international law in a way that has constrained their ability to govern. As is
discussed below, this belief led the United States to change its model BIT in 2004
to more clearly define the scope of protections it was providing to foreign
investors.
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actions exceed those boundaries. In a system based on consent,
however, the perception of reality may be as important as reality
itself. If developing countries continue to believe that their right to
govern is unduly constrained by participation in the international
investment law system, other countries could follow Bolivia's lead.
3.1.2. Outside of Latin America
Countries in Latin American are not the only ones that
seemingly are frustrated with the current international investment
law system. Outside of Latin America, one of the more notable
examples of the emerging reluctance to participate in the
international arbitral system is the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement. 12 Signed on September 9, 2006, the
Agreement is a joint trade-investment treaty that is intended to
promote "stronger economic linkages" between Japan and the
Philippines and to "create a legal framework" for enhanced trade
and investment. 1" 3 The Agreement grants investors from each state
a broad range of protections, including provisions on
uncompensated expropriation, national treatment, denial of justice,
most-favored nation treatment, and performance-requirement
prohibitions. 14 The Agreement further provides for increased
transparency for investments. 115  Despite the breadth of
protections, however, the Agreement does not provide investors a
right to international arbitration. Rather, the Agreement provides
that the parties shall continue to negotiate for a mutually
acceptable dispute resolution procedure and that, in the absence of
an agreement, an investor may submit a dispute to "international
112 See Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an
Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., Sept. 9, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/asia-paci/philippine/epa06O9/index.html [hereinafter JPEPA]
(recognizing the agreement between Japan and the Philippines encouraging
innovation and competition). Although the Agreement has been ratified by
Japan, it is facing significant resistance among Philippine opponents. See, e.g.,
Veronica Uy, Senators Slam 'Fuzzy' Gov't Presentation of JPEPA, INQUIRER.NET, Sept.
14, 2007, http://archive.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&story-id=88592 (quoting
Senator Manuel Roxas II as saying, "I am under-whelmed by the presentation of
the government which in my estimate alone, based on their presentation, if the
voting were held today, JPEPA will lose").
113 JPEPA, supra note 112, at 10-11.
114 Id. arts. 89-92, 95.
115 See id. art. 3 (calling for, among other things, prompt publishing of
member laws, names of authorities responsible for laws, and responses to further
questions from members regarding paragraph 1 matters).
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conciliation or arbitration" only after receiving the express consent
of the state-parties to the Agreement.1 6  The Philippines'
reluctance to allow for international arbitration is not surprising in
light of its experience with prior investment-related disputes." 7
The fact that this reluctance has led to the signing of an investment
treaty that does not provide investors with access to any
international dispute-resolution forum, however, is quite
remarkable. As mentioned above, the international investment law
system was predicated on the idea of giving investors access to
international arbitration, thus allowing developing countries to
attract foreign investment. 118 There was concern that merely
granting rights without simultaneously giving investors means to
enforce those rights would result in a hollow and ineffective
system. At present, Japanese and Philippine investors theoretically
are little better off than they were before the signing of the
Agreement. Although entitled to express investment protections,
they are limited either to the host-country's local courts or to their
own government's diplomatic protection as a means of resolving
investment-related disputes. As discussed above, neither of those
options is particularly attractive to foreign investors.
116 See id. art. 107 (stating that "[i]n the absence of a mechanism for the
settlement of an investment dispute between a party and an investor of the other
party, the resort to international conciliation or arbitral tribunal is subject to
mutual consent of the parties to the dispute. This means that the disputing party,
at its option or discretion, grant or deny its consent in respect of each particular
investment dispute and that, in the absence of the express written consent of the
disputing party, an international conciliation or arbitration tribunal shall have no
jurisdiction over the investment dispute involved.").
117 See SGS Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC657_En&caseId=C6 (bringing
the Philippines to arbitration in June 2002 by the French company SGS Soci~t6
GLnrale de Surveillance S.A. regarding the provision of certain customs and
export-related services). As of the date of this article, the case against the
Philippines is still pending.
118 "[T]he rationale for the 1965 Washington ICSID Convention was to assure
potential prospective investors that disputes arising out of investments, primarily
in developing countries, could be adjudicated before an international tribunal,
rather than before the courts of the country concerned. The existence of such a
facility and the assurance of impartiality and predictability also works to the
benefit of the country concerned, which has an interest in attracting foreign
investment for its economic development." Reed, supra note 32, at 234 (referring
to comments by Andrew Jacovides).
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3.2. Challenges to the Substantive Rights Accorded Investors
The vast majority of BITs in existence today are based on
models created by the United States and some European countries.
These models provide investors with broad, open-ended
protections, such as the prohibition against discriminatory
treatment and the requirement that governments treat investors
fairly and equitably. The breadth of investor protections found in
these models reflects the fact that most bilateral investment treaties
are between developed and developing states. Although BITs
impose obligations on both signatories, at the time most of the U.S.
BITs were signed, there was little investment flowing from
developing countries into the United States. 119 Thus, the United
States did not enter into its BITs expecting to be a respondent in an
investment dispute.
Times have changed. Over the past several years, the United
States has been the respondent in multiple investment disputes.
As such, it is subject to the same broad scope of investor
protections that led Bolivia to withdraw from ICSID.120 In 2004, in
response to its new-found role as a respondent, the United States
created a new model BIT that contains far more detailed provisions
on certain procedural matters and certain substantive protections
accorded to investors. 121  In particular, the 2004 Model BIT
amended the provisions governing the minimum standard of
treatment (Article 5 and Annex A) and the applicable standard for
expropriation (Article 6 and Annex B).122
119 See, e.g., Catherine Brown & Christine Manolakas, Trade in Technology
Within the Free Trade Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA, and Tax
Treaties on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 71, 97 n.176 (2000)
(noting that "capital investment flows primarily from the developed country to
the developing country").
120 To date, the United States has been a respondent in thirteen investment
disputes, all of which were brought under the auspices of NAFTA Chapter 11. See
U.S. Department of State, Cases Filed Against the United States,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) (listing NAFTA
Investor-State Arbitrations).
121 The 2004 Model BIT provides greater detail on procedural issues such as
access to investor-state dispute settlement (Articles 23-34) and transparency of
national laws 837 and proceedings (Article 11). U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & USTR, U.S.
MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 1 (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Trade-Sectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset upload-file847_6897.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 Model BIT].
122 For a fuller discussion of these new standards, see also Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 97 AM. J.
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The effect of these amendments arguably was to weaken the
protections accorded to U.S. investors. For example, the 1994
Model BIT contained a prohibition against uncompensated
expropriations. The prohibition was drafted broadly and applied
to direct, indirect, creeping, consequential, and regulatory
expropriations. The 2004 Model BIT, however, severely limits the
possibility of regulatory and certain indirect or creeping
expropriations by providing that, "[e]xcept in rare circumstances,
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriation."123 The 2004 Model BIT further limits
existing protections against uncompensated expropriation in that
its provisions on uncompensated expropriation are "intended to
reflect customary international law concerning the obligation of
States with respect to expropriation." 124  Although seemingly
straightforward, this standard may lead to significant confusion
since it was the uncertainty of customary international law that, at
least in part, fostered the growth of the BIT regime.125 Indeed, as
Judge Stephen Schwebel has noted, "[t]here is no agreement within
the international community on the content of customary
international law on which the 2004 Model BIT relies." 126
In addition, the 2004 Model BIT amends provisions dealing
discriminatory, and fair and equitable treatment. The 1994 U.S.
model BIT provided that a host government "shall at all times
accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security, and in no case shall accord treatment less
favorable than that required by international law." 127 In addition,
the prior model BIT provided that host governments may not "in
INT'L L. 681, 696-97 (2003) (detailing the expropriation articles in a bilateral fee
trade agreement between the United States and Chile).
123 2004 Model BIT, supra note 121, at Annex B, para. 4(b).
124 Id., at Annex B, para. 1.
125 See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 332 (1994)
(arguing that "it is th[e] uncertainty relating to the law on state responsibility that
has given an impetus to the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties").
126 See Stephen Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L
DIsP. MGMT. 1, 4 (2006) (describing the deficiencies of the 2004 Model BIT).
127 U.S. DEPT OF STATE & USTR, U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 1
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Model BIT].
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any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
covered investments." 128 By contrast, the 2004 Model BIT provides
that a host government "shall accord to covered investments
treatment in accordance with customary international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security." 129 The 2004 Model BIT defines what is meant by that
provision:
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribed the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens
as the minimum standard to be afforded to covered
investments. The concepts of 'fair and equitable' treatment
and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment
in addition to or beyond that which is required by that
standard, and do not create any additional substantive
rights. 30
The seemingly innocuous change in language between these
two treaties has led to a material change in the substantive
protection given to foreign investors. For example, the 2004 Model
BIT has eliminated the prohibition against "unreasonable and
discriminatory treatment." Moreover, it has reduced the level of
protection provided by the treaty. Arbitral tribunals have held that
language such as that used in the 1994 Model BIT required states to
provide better treatment to foreign investments than was required
by the minimum standards international law. In Azurix, the
arbitral tribunal held:
Turning now to Article 11.2(a), this paragraph provides:
"Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable
treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall
in no case be accorded treatment less than required by
international law." The paragraph consists of three full
statements, each listing in sequence a standard of treatment
to be accorded to investments: fair and equitable, full
protection and security, not less than required by
international law. Fair and equitable treatment is listed
128 Id. art. 2, para. 3(b).
129 Id. art. 5, para. 1.
130 Id. art. 5, para. 2.
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separately. The last sentence ensures that, whichever
content is attributed to the other two standards, the
treatment accorded to investment will be no less than
required by international law. The clause, as drafted,
permits to interpret fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security as higher standards than required
by international law.131
Thus, the purpose of the fair and equitable treatment provision
in the 1994 Model BIT (and each of the BITs containing such
language) was "to set a floor, not a ceiling, in order to avoid a
possible interpretation of these standards below what is required
by international law." 132 The 2004 Model BIT, however, reverses
the situation by establishing that customary international law sets
the upper limit of protection that a state must provide to foreign
investments.
When drafting the 2004 Model BIT, the United States
encountered significant resistance to the proposed changes
described above. The U.S. State Department requested that its
Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy review and
comment on the draft model BIT33 The Advisory Committee's
Subcommittee on Investment issued a report outlining the views of
its members, which it summarized as follows:
[T]he Members who represent investors do not believe that
the 1994 model BIT needs to be or should be changed. The
1994 model BIT offers strong protections against the
substantial risks that face U.S. investors abroad, as
demonstrated by ten years of case law, and it continues to
reflect modern international law and investment practice.
These Members believe that the draft model BIT circulated
in December [2003], by contrast, represents a substantial
weakening of investor protections that in large part are not
compelled by the TPA legislation nor justified by any
reasonable assessment of risk to the United States as a
131 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
para. 361 (July 14, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC507_En
&caseld=C5.
132 Id.
133 The Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy is a committee
of nongovernmental experts representing a wide range of interests.
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defendant against potential claims. These Members believe
that foreign investors already enjoy under U.S. law
protections comparable to those found in the 1994 model
BIT. By contrast, U.S. investors abroad often confront
undeveloped legal systems without independent
judiciaries. These Members therefore believe that adapting
the model BIT to the investment chapters of the recent
FTAs serves only to perpetuate a downward trend in
protection for U.S. investors, while their European
competitors continue to benefit from BITs that now set the
standard for investor protection.134
The long-term effect of the 2004 Model BITs substantive
changes cannot be predicted. Some argue that the new model BIT
simply "reconcile[s] the objectives of strong investor protection
with the possibility for governments to enact regulations without
fear of compensatory claims."135 As such, the changes merely
clarify substantive provisions and on procedural safeguard
mechanisms but do not undermine fundamental investor
protections. 136 By contrast, others, including Judge Schwebel, have
argued that the provisions of the 2004 Model BIT reflect a
substantial retreat from the investor protections of the 1994 Model
BIT. 137  At a minimum, the new provisions will put the
international investment law system to yet another test as arbitral
tribunals are forced to interpret its meaning and define the scope of
protections accorded to foreign investors.
4. CONCLUSION
The international investment law system plays a unique role in
the regulation of sovereign conduct. It developed quickly as a
means of stimulating private investment and conferring upon
private actors a direct right of action against governments. In 1992,
134 ADVISORY COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POLIcY, REP. OF THE SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTMENT POL'Y REGARDING THE DRAFr MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 2
(Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/BITSubcmte
_Jan3004.pdf.
135 Gilbert Gagn6 & Jean-Fr~d~rick Morin, The Evolving American Policy on
Investment Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, J. INT'L
ECON. L. 357, 382 (2006).
136 Id.
137 See Schwebel, supra note 126, at 4 (describing the weakening of investor
protections in the 2004 Model BIT as compared to the 1994 Model BIT).
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Jose Alvarez commented that "[c]ountries are now turning to BITs
in hope of economic benefits; if the benefits fail to materialize,
there is the danger of a potent backlash."138 Indeed, according to
Professor Alvarez, "[i]t remains to be seen.., what will happen...
if the investments fail to come or ... if the investors cause more
problems ... than the investment is worth." 139  Today, some
governments are beginning to shed light on what could happen
under those circumstances. Governments are pushing back against
the system in large and small ways. The long-term legitimacy and
credibility of the system will depend on how well and how quickly
it can respond to those challenges. That means that all participants
will be required to adjust their expectations if the system is to
flourish. The United States is attempting to more clearly define the
scope of protections accorded to investors through changes to its
Model BIT. In doing so, it has arguably narrowed the scope of
protections available to investors. Investors, in turn, may be
required to adjust their expectations in such a way that will allow
them to operate in the changing legal environment.
138 Jose E. Alvarez, The Development and Expansion of Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Remarks, 86 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 550, 553 (1992).
139 Id.
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